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I. INTRODUCTION
A debate over health care and health insurance options continues in
the nation today. Authorities cite various statistical ranges for the
number of uninsured people in the United States' In the race to provide
national health care coverage, however, one often overlooked problem is
that even many insured people are uninsured or underinsured for certain
conditions. Chief among these conditions is mental illness, for which
insurance is often strictly limited as to type and amount.
2
1. In the United States "approximately 34.4 million persons under the age of 65 [are]
uninsured and millions more [are] underinsured." DONALD L. WESTERFIELD, NATIONAL HEALTH
CARE LAW, POLICY, STRATEGY 13 (1993). Westerfield attributes the size of this group to the
astoundingly high costs of modem medicine. He postulates that by the year 2000 one-sixth of
America's annual production dollars will be spent on health care. Id. at 3.
2. For example, inpatient mental health care is limited by a cap on the number of days in the
hospital that insurers will cover. Often, insureds are limited to 30 or 60 days of inpatient mental
health care, whereas the limit for physical illness may be significantly higher or nonexistent.
Outpatient mental health care is also strictly controlled with limits on the number of visits allowed
and the amount that will be paid for these visits. A 1985 survey of medium and large firms
showed that 26% of full-time participants in employer-sponsored health plans limited the number
of payable visits per policy period and 71% imposed dollar limits per visit and per policy period.
Allan P. Blostin, Mental Health Benefits Financed by Employers, 110 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 23, 24
(July 1987).
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A. The Mental Illness Limitation
The prevalence of underinsurance for mental illness is due in part
to the social stigma attached to it. "Anglo-American society historically
has viewed the mentally ill as outsiders,"3 and most people continue to
view mental illness with a certain amount of suspicion and skepticism.4
Despite better education and more publicity, people still tend to believe
that the mentally ill create their own problems, or that mental illness is
something that a person should be able to overcome or "deal with."5
Insurers articulate many reasons for limiting mental health care
benefits, stressing cost containment and the relative subjectivity of
mental treatment.6 Where cost-reduction is the goal, mental health serv-
ices seem to be an easy target: the services are relatively confined to a
single area of medicine, are socially stigmatized, and the efficacy of
mental therapy is believed to be less obvious or documented. Further-
more, "mental disorders are not as easy to define as other illnesses," and
"mental health problems can be subjective."7 As a result, insurers assert
that the duration of psychiatric treatment is often indefinite.' Insurers
fear a version of adverse selection attributed to mental health care:
insurers, believing that people have advance notice of a current or incipi-
ent need for psychiatric services or counseling, fear that people will shop
around for the best mental health care coverage. 9
3. Wayne Edward Ramage, The Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for Mental Health
Care, 45 VAND. L. REV. 951, 951 (1992).
4. David Mechanic, Mental Health Services in the Context of Health Insurance Reform, 71
MILBANK Q. 349, 352-53 (1993).
5. Many scholars recognize the continuing stigma associated with mental illness, which rests
on a popular belief that somehow the mentally ill have caused their own problems or have "lost
control" of their emotions or their minds. Ramage, supra note 3, at 972-73; see also Steven S.
Sharfstein, Articulating the Case for Equitable Mental Health Coverage, 42 Hosp. AND
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 453 (1991).
6. Insurers "believe that judgments about medical necessity in mental health are less precise
than similar judgments in other areas of medicine. As a result they fear that if mental health
services [are] given parity with other medical services ... insurance finds will be siphoned into a
'bottomless pit.'" James E. Sabin & Norman Daniels, Determining 'Medical Necessity' in
Mental Health Practice, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 5 (footnote omitted). Mental
health care costs must be controlled if only because the "[v]ague end points, diagnostic ambiguity,
and elastic interventions create considerable 'moral hazard,' "in that people will seek insured care
and clinicians will seek to give care in a form that is covered. Barry Blackwell, No Margin, No
Mission, 271 JAMA 1466 (1994).
7. Blostin, supra note 2, at 23 (footnote omitted).
8. Id. See also Mechanic, supra note 4, at 354.
9. "One reason for insufficient coverage arises from insurers' fear of adverse selection. The
insurers are concerned that any plan offering better protection against mental health care costs
may attract a disproportionate number of persons who anticipate using mental health care."
Jeffrey Rubin, Financing Mental Health Care, 28 Hous. LAW RE vIEw 143, 157 (1991); see also
Sabin & Daniels, supra note 6, at 9 ("Insurance underwriters fear that if mental health insurance
becomes more available, individuals . . . might claim to suffer from an illness when they are
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All health and major medical insurance policies contain limitations
and exclusions. There are lifetime aggregates for benefits, as well as
caps on coverage during any one policy period. There are also exclu-
sions and limitations affecting certain classes of problems and types of
care. Three of the most common are the experimental medical treatment
exclusion, 10 the preexisting condition exclusion, l' and the mental illness
limitation. This last limitation caps benefits for mental health care at
levels far lower than those for "physical" conditions.' 2
actually suffering from life .... "); Mechanic, supra note 4, at 352-53 ("Moral hazard," the
"inclination to use services more when they are fully insured .... ," is prevalent in mental health
services where utilization "is more responsive to price than is use of general medical services,"
especially psychotherapy.).
10. Insurers use the experimental medical treatment exclusion to deny coverage for
procedures that are new or untested and which may have little medical value. Mark A. Hall &
Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers'Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637,
1638 (1992). The generally asserted rationale behind this exclusion, and most other exclusions
and limitations, is cost containment. Experimental medical treatment exclusions commonly take
the following forms:
In addition to certain exclusions and limitations already described in this rider,
we will not pay under this rider when any of the following apply to you: .... 18.
Experimental/Investigative Services. We will not pay for any service or procedure
we do not recognize as accepted medical practice as we determine has no proven
medical value.
Kekis v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utica-Watertown, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 571, 575 (N.D.N.Y.
1993) (benefits improperly denied for Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant (ABMT) operation
where ABMT had medical value despite labels of "experimental" or "study").
"Exclusions-Medical Services and Supplies which are NOT Covered Medical
Expenses .... (10) Services or supplies which are deemed experimental in terms of generally
accepted medical standards." Westover v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp 1172, 1173
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (benefits for chelation therapy for arteriosclerosis properly denied where FDA
labelled the procedure "experimental" and not generally practiced by the medical profession).
11. The preexisting condition exclusion excludes or limits insurance coverage:
for charges or expenses incurred during a specified period (most often 3, 6, or 12
months) following the insured's effective date of coverage. The term 'preexisting
condition' refers to a condition which, during a specified period immediately
preceding the effective date of coverage, had manifested itself in such a manner as
would cause an ordinarily prudent person to seek medical ... care or treatment.
WESTERFIELD, supra note 1, at 30 (footnote omitted).
Preexisting condition exclusions tend to be relatively complex. For example:
Part J. PREEXISTING INJURY OR SICKNESS PROVISIONS.
The benefits of this policy will not be payable for any preexisting injury or sickness
for the first six months following the Policy Date. Preexisting injury or sickness
means an injury of [sic] sickness which:
(a) manifested itself within six months prior to the Policy Date in such a way that
an ordinarily prudent person would seek diagnosis, care or treatment; or
(b) medical advice or treatment was recommended or advised within six months
prior to Policy Date. We will pay for loss or expense incurred after such six-month
period.
Indiana Comprehensive Health Ins. Ass'n v. Dye, 531 N.E.2d 505, 506-507 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
12. "Coverage for mental disorders is usually for shorter periods and maximum dollar
benefits are often lower. Also, plans commonly pay a smaller share of mental health care
1996]
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This Comment will explain the mental illness limitation and the
mental-physical distinction that follows from it. Courts have drawn a
mental-physical distinction when insureds challenge their insurers
mental illness coverage determinations. Courts are forced to get
involved when the policy language is unclear on the meaning of "mental
illness," and a coverage dispute arises. The most common scenario is
that an insured receiving treatment for a so-called mental disorder (e.g.,
affective mood disorder or bipolar disorder) will sue to force the insurer
to pay above and beyond the mental illness limitation.
B. The Three Approaches
Courts have taken three approaches in making the mental-physical
distinction. The first is the symptom/manifestation approach, where the
court focuses on actual symptoms of the illness to determine whether it
is mental or physical. Courts using this approach interpret the term
"mental illness" from the perspective of a layperson, and deny coverage
where the symptoms would generally be considered "mental." Symp-
tom courts rely heavily on what they consider to be a layperson's inter-
pretation of mental illness, and tend to ignore expert testimony and
scientific evidence that certain illnesses are organically-based diseases
of the brain.
The second approach is the treatment approach, where the court
focuses on the nature of the care or treatment in determining whether the
illness is mental or physical. Courts adopting this approach do not inter-
pret the term "mental illness." Instead, they grant or deny coverage
based on their interpretations of standard policy terms such as "psychiat-
ric/medical treatment" and "mental/physical care." To that extent, the
treatment approach encompasses a semantic analysis of the specific
phrasing of the exclusion or limitation. In making their determinations,
treatment courts rely on expert analysis of the type or nature of the
expenses." Blostin, supra note 2, at 23. A contested plan in one case demonstrates this
discrepancy: The employee welfare benefit (major medical) plan provided for a $1,000,000
maximum lifetime benefit for major medical benefits. In contrast, the maximum benefit for
mental illness was limited to $25,000. The maximum benefit for mental illness was further
circumscribed in that it reimbursed the insured a maximum of $20.00 for each visit, and limited
the insured to one visit per day and 50 visits per calendar year. Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 774 F. Supp. 495, 496 (N.D. II1. 1991). In another case, a similar limitation provided that "in
connection with treatment or care of nervous, mental or alcoholic conditions.... [t]he maximum
payable.., will be 50% of the eligible charges subject also to the maximum payable in any one
calendar year of $2,000 for in-patient expenses and $550 for out-patient expenses." Malerbi v.
Central Reserve Life of N. Am. Ins. Co., 407'N.W.2d 157, 161 (Neb. 1987). Such limitations are
not unusual in health insurance policies, and many insureds probably do not even realize that the
limit exists, much less that it is so much lower than the limit for more traditional physical care.
[Vol. 50:345
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insured's treatment. Results under this analysis are mixed, due to the
variety of treatments in use.
The third approach is the causation approach, where the court
focuses on the cause or etiology of the illness to determine whether it is
mental or physical. Courts adopting this approach interpret the term
"mental illness" to mean those illnesses or disorders that have a purely
functional or psychological cause. Illnesses that are shown to have
physical or organic origins are considered "physical illness," even
though the illnesses manifest themselves in functional or behavioral
ways. Causation courts vary in their use of layperson's or expert's defi-
nitions of mental illness, but often rely on expert testimony as to the
etiology of the disease at issue. 13
C. Eliminating the Distinction
The purpose of the mental-physical distinction is to aid courts in
determining insurance coverage where insureds dispute their company's
coverage determination and seek to avoid policy exclusions or limita-
tions.' 4 More systematically, insurers say the distinction serves their
cost containment and risk classification purposes in that it places a heav-
ier burden on those presumed to be at a higher risk for mental problems.
But considering that modem medical research has found that many so-
called mental illnesses have physical or organic origins,' 5 it seems that
the mental-physical distinction fosters the social stigmatization of
mental illnesses. In other words, the distinction does nothing more than
distinguish one group of insureds from another on the basis of the tradi-
tional understanding of 'mental' sickness versus the traditional under-
standing of 'physical' illness.
A more systematic approach to the problem is needed both to
relieve courts of the burden of defining mental illness for purposes of
insurance coverage, and to achieve an equitable balance between the
interests of the insureds and the insurers. This approach could be either
judicial or extrajudicial, although if the goal is to relieve the burden on
13. See, e.g., Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 696 F. Supp. 1342 (C.D. Cal. 1988);
Malerbi, 407 N.W.2d at 157.
14. See, e.g., Margaret Levy, Current Coverage Issues in Health Insurance Law: Is There
Coverage When There Is No Coverage?, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 621, 628 (1991).
15. "Recent medical studies and analyses of the brain have established that serious mental
illnesses are organic brain diseases." Brian D. Shannon, The Brain Gets Sick, Too-The Case for
Equal Insurance Coverage for Serious Mental Illness, 24 ST. MARY's L.J. 365, 367 (1993).
Shannon cites numerous medical studies that have resulted in conclusive evidence that many
severe mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, severe depression, and bipolar affective disorder
(also known as manic-depression) can be traced to measurable physiological changes or affects in
the brain. Id. at 368-69. Shannon also notes that these diseases of the brain are treatable. Id. at
369.
1996]
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the courts, an extrajudicial solution would be more appropriate. As it
stands now, each jurisdiction has adopted one approach, based on its
attitude towards insurance coverage and the mentally ill. In response,
insurers alter their policy language at renewal to avoid unfavorable
results. There are two potential solutions that would resolve the ambigu-
ity of the term mental illness and, possibly, take the determination away
from the courts. One solution clarifies the mental-physical distinction
by creating a bright-line rule that courts and insurers can easily follow.
The other eliminates the need for the distinction by forcing insurers to
standardize their mental illness limitations.
Currently, courts must define "mental illness" in order to grant or
deny coverage under most mental illness limitations. To make these
determinations, courts have developed the three previously discussed
approaches that reflect different attitudes towards insurance coverage
and the mentally ill. These approaches all rest on a mental-physical dis-
tinction. The courts should recognize that this distinction itself is rela-
tively meaningless. If the courts were to unify their treatment of mental
illness limitations by adopting the symptom approach, the result would
be less ambiguity and a more objective standard. The weakness in this
proposal is that it leaves coverage determinations to the courts, which
would still routinely deny coverage to the mentally ill.
A second option would combine precision in policy language with
a series of state mandates. This approach would ensure a minimum
level of coverage for the mentally ill while relieving the courts of the
burden of deciding how to distribute that coverage. Using more precise
language would provide insurers with more predictability in mental
health care costs, and the state mandates would ensure that those most in
need of mental health care would receive it.
II. THE THREE APPROACHES
A. The Symptom/Manifestation Approach
In determining whether a mental illness exclusion or limitation
applies, courts adopting the symptom/manifestation approach place
more weight on symptoms and manifestations of illness than on etiol-
ogy. This approach is dependent on the layperson's perception and
understanding of mental illness. Symptom courts reason that because a
reasonable layperson would characterize a mental illness by its symp-
toms, then if those symptoms are present, the illness must be mental
despite any physical causation or organic basis.16 The symptom
16. E.g., Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir. 1990): "Robert C.
Brewer's disease manifested itself in terms of mood swings and aberrant behavior. Regardless of
[Vol. 50:345
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approach is the most popular with insurers who want to deny coverage,
and where courts adopt it, insurers often win.
The case epitomizing the symptom approach is Equitable Life
Assurance Society v. Berry. 7 The Berry court determined that Berry's
total disability was not covered under a disability policy that denied cov-
erage for mental disorders unless the insured was confined to specialized
institutions. 8 Although Berry was not confined to such an institution at
any relevant time, he was totally disabled by manic depression and
sought benefits under both his disability policy and his group medical
plan. Both insurers denied coverage under the limitations and exclu-
sions relating to mental or nervous disorders, a category which the
insurer argued included "manic-depressive illness."' 9
The court sustained the denial of benefits despite testimony that
manic depression has an organic etiology and is not a functional disor-
der. The court acknowledged that it is common when interpreting insur-
ance contracts that "exclusions in a policy are strictly construed against
the insurer and liberally interpreted in favor of the insured,"20 but went
on to say that if there is nothing to interpret, then plain meaning will
control. According to the court "plain meaning" is the interpretation that
a layperson would give to the language in question.2 Where a disorder
manifests itself in functional inability to cope, mood swings, and
extreme depression, then those symptoms suggest a mental illness as the
clear language of the policy intended.22 In the court's words,
"[m]anifestation, not cause, is the yardstick. '2 3
The Berry approach to the mental illness limitation was refined in
Brewer v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co.,24 where the insured
the cause of his disorder, it is abundantly clear that he suffered from what laypersons would
consider to be a 'mental illness.' "
17. 260 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
18. The policy stated: "Disabilities Not Covered: Long Term Disability Benefits are not
provided for: Mental or nervous disorders, alcoholism or use of hallucinogenic drugs, except
while confined to an institution specializing in the care of such disorders." Id. at 821. Another
provision of Berry's medical policy stated that, "[t]he Plan only pays 50% of physician's charges
for mental and/or nervous treatment while not confined in a hospital to a maximum benefit of
$500 in any one calendar year. Mental or nervous treatment means treatment for a neurosis,
psycho-neurosis, psychopathy, psychosis, or mental or nervous disease or disorder of any kind."
Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 822.
21. Id. at 823.
22. The court referred indirectly to the type of care Berry had been receiving by noting that
all of his physicians were psychiatrists. Id. at 824. That the court makes this point suggests some
awareness of the treatment approach, but the court did not analyze the implications of receiving
care exclusively from psychiatrists.
23. Id. (footnote omitted).
24. 921 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1990).
1996]
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sought to recover the costs of hospitalizing his son for acute behavioral
problems. The son was treated for affective mood disorder. Both of
Brewer's medical policies had limits on the coverage for mental health
care. One policy limited charges associated with "mental illness, func-
tional nervous disorder(s), . . . or for psychiatric or psychoanalytic
care." 26 The other policy limited charges associated with treatment of
"mental illness. 27
The Brewer court, in addressing its approach to interpreting such
limitations, stated that "[i]t would be improper and unfair to allow
experts to define terms that were specifically written for and targeted
toward laypersons. ' '28 The court determined that to define mental illness
it would therefore have to look to a layperson's general assessment of
the symptoms for coverage because "[t]he cause of a disease is a judg-
ment for experts, while laymen know and understand symptoms. Lay-
men ... do not classify illnesses based on their origins .... [I]llnesses
whose primary symptoms are depression, mood swings and unusual
behavior are commonly characterized as mental illnesses regardless of
their cause."29 The court further pointed out that the language of the
policies did not exclude mental illnesses because they had mental or
functional causes, but rather limited coverage for those illnesses that
manifested themselves mentally.30 What a layperson would consider
mental should control. The Brewer court decided that a layperson would
consider affective mood disorder to be a mental illness subject to the
limitations of the medical policies, due to its behavioral manifestations.
Another case where the court applied the symptom approach and
adopted the Brewer analysis is Stauch v. Unisys Corp.3 In Stauch, the
insured sought long-term disability benefits under a group disability pol-
icy beyond the policy's twenty-four month mental illness limitation.32
Despite conflicting medical diagnoses and testimony, the court believed
that Stauch was suffering from a "mental illness within the ordinary
meaning of that term and within the meaning of that term as it is used in
the disability policy. ' 33 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on
Brewer, held that the insurer had properly terminated coverage after
twenty-four months. 34 The court also stated that the varied diagnoses of
25. Id. at 152.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 154.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 24 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 1994).
32. Id. at 1055.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1055-56.
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Stauch's illness were irrelevant because his symptoms were "what
laypersons would consider... 'mental, nervous, or emotional ....
The circuit court concluded that the district court had properly focused
on the symptoms of Stauch's illness rather than its irrelevant cause.36
To the extent that the symptom approach allows courts to gloss
over ambiguous phrases such as "mental illness" and "nervous disor-
ders," it is contrary to established principles of contract construction.
Where policy language states that mental illnesses will be covered to a
lesser degree than physical illnesses but does not define either, the court
should clarify these terms where to do otherwise leaves insureds without
certainty or coverage.
Several questions illustrate the ambiguity of such terms. Is an ill-
ness mental merely because a person suffering from it has mood swings
and cognitive confusion? Many cancer and other terminally ill patients
suffer from bouts of depression and disorientation. Is it fair to consider
an illness mental even if medical experts testify that its symptoms are
caused by a chemical, organic imbalance in the brain that can be treated
with medication? Would not the average layperson reassess her opinion
of what mental illness is if she heard and believed such medical testi-
mony? These questions highlight the difficulties and weaknesses behind
the symptom/manifestation approach. Many courts have noted these
problems and have chosen another approach or analysis when con-
fronted with mental illness limitations.
B. The Treatment Approach
One alternative means of analysis is the so-called treatment
approach.37 This approach is the least utilized, partly because the policy
language determines whether this approach can be used. It can be used
only if the policy language places limits on coverage according to the
35. Id. at 1056.
36. Id.
37. Some commentators have suggested that the treatment approach is not an approach to the
mental illness limitation at all, but rather a response to a slightly different kind of exclusion.
Generally, courts apply the treatment approach where the policy language excludes certain kinds
of treatment, such as treatment for psychiatric care or mental health treatment. This is not the
same as the average mental illness limitation to which the symptom or the causation approach
could easily be applied. The mental illness limitation excludes coverage for mental illnesses,
apparently regardless of the type of care an illness would require. At issue in the treatment cases
are one coverage exclusions for particular kinds of treatment, apparently regardless of the illness
for which care is needed. However, to the extent that courts using the treatment approach draw a
mental/physical distinction, that approach is often categorized with the symptom and causation
approaches. The treatment approach probably is more appropriately catalogued as a different
distinction altogether, but there are certain similarities that make grouping the treatment analysis
with the other two approaches beneficial.
1996]
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type of care or limits psychiatric treatment regardless of cause or need.38
Courts adopting the treatment analysis focus on the type of care
involved rather than the reason for that care. Courts look at the type of
care either to determine whether the illness itself is mental or physical,
or to classify different treatments where the policy in question limits
coverage for one kind of care but not another. In either situation courts
do not interpret the terms "mental illness" or "nervous disorder."
Rather, they distinguish between, for example, "psychiatric" and "medi-
cal" treatments based on the nature of the care. To the extent that treat-
ment courts are making a mental-physical treatment distinction, they do
not follow the patterns of the symptom and causation courts. However,
it is appropriate that some courts use the treatment approach where an
insurer invokes a mental illness or mental health care limitation to deny
coverage.
Two cases typify the mixed results that flow from the treatment
analysis. In Simons v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield,3 9 the court held that
hospitalization costs resulting from malnourishment caused by acute
anorexia nervosa were covered, regardless of the mental illness limita-
tion. The limits in the policy at issue were based on treatment, regard-
less of cause, and the patient was receiving physical care for anorexia-
induced dehydration and malnourishment. The court felt it was irrele-
vant that anorexia nervosa is considered a mental disorder, because its
effects led to a need for physical, as opposed to solely psychiatric,
care.' The court glossed over the fact that the patient received some
psychiatric treatment and counseling, because the bulk of the expenses
at issue related to necessary medical care.
In Saah v. Contel Corp.,4 the insured unsuccessfully sought cover-
age for her son's treatment in a medical rehabilitation center after he
suffered brain damage in a car accident.42 The insurer denied coverage
beyond the policy limit because the son was to receive "behavior modi-
fication and group therapy," both of which the court considered to be
psychiatric in nature, regardless of why the son needed treatment.4" The
court held that the insurer's coverage determination was reasonable
38. For example, the group medical plan at issue in Saah v. Contel Corp., 780 F. Supp. 311
(D. Md. 1991), stated that "benefits for psychiatric and substance abuse care are subject to a
combined $100,000 lifetime individual maximum." Id. at 315 n.l. The policy in Garred v.
General American Life Insurance Co., 774 F. Supp. 1190 (W.D. Ark. 1991), stated that "Major
Medical Expense Benefits are not payable for: . . . psychological testing, counseling and group
therapy... [and] treatment of nervous and mental condition." Id. at 1192.
39. 536 N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
40. Id. at 434.
41. 780 F. Supp. 311 (D. Md. 1991).
42. Id. at 313.
43. Id.
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because it was "supported by the plain language of the plan."'  The
policy clearly limited benefits for "psychiatric or substance abuse care"
more than benefits for physical care.45 The court held this way despite
the fact that the patient's psychiatric care was directly linked to his brain
damage and resulting problems.
Both the Simons and Saah courts looked to the treatment in ques-
tion and ignored the causes of the need for treatment. In Simons, this
approach resulted in a judgment for the insured solely because the
patient was receiving medical care. It did not matter that the insured's
mental condition-anorexia nervosa-caused her to need that medical
care. In Saah this approach resulted in a judgment for the insurer solely
because the patient received "psychiatric" care. It did not matter that the
patient needed the care because of a car accident and subsequent brain
damage. The results of both cases seem counterintuitive. Where a pol-
icy excludes care for mental illness, it does not seem logical that a policy
would cover any care, physical or psychiatric, for an illness such as
anorexia nervosa. Similarly, where insurance apparently covers an
insured for all treatment for a serious injury, it is not logical to leave a
brain-damaged patient effectively uninsured for therapy that accompa-
nies treatment for his brain damage. In this respect, the treatment
approach is unreliable, and runs counter to the apparent intent of the
contracting parties.
C. The Causation Approach
The final analysis when addressing a mental illness limitation is the
causation approach. This approach is the most favorable from the
insured's perspective, because it embodies the argument that treatment
for mental illness is not intended to be limited under a policy's mental
illness limitation where the illness has a physical or organic basis. The
issue under the causation approach is whether an illness can be consid-
ered mental where it is caused by a chemical imbalance or some other
organic feature, but is manifested by mental symptoms. If a disease has
a physical cause, is it not a physical illness, as that term is commonly
understood, despite the fact that its symptoms may be psychological?
Although it was not the first to adopt the causation approach, Kunin
v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co." is likely the best known case on the
matter due to the court's well-reasoned analysis. In Kunin, an insured
father sought coverage for the treatment of his son's autism, a "syn-
drome" considered secondary to the diagnosis of organic brain dysfunc-
44. Id. at 318.
45. Id. at 315 n.l.
46. 696 F. Supp. 1342 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
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tion.47 Kunin's insurance policy limited "medical benefits for 'mental
illness or nervous disorders' to a maximum of $10,000 in any calendar
year."
48
The court began with the proposition that autism is a syndrome
because it is identified by its symptoms, which are mostly behavioral.
The court analyzed the medical evidence presented by both parties. It
concluded that the evidence supported a finding that autism has a
demonstrable physical basis, even though the behavioral aspects of the
syndrome are used to identify the illness. 9 The court then defined
mental illness for purposes of policy limitation using a layperson's defi-
nition, and concluded that "mental illness is often thought of by lay per-
sons as having nonphysical, psychological causes ... as opposed to an
organic basis. Where dysfunctions of the brain derive from an identifi-
able organic basis..., the condition would not commonly be understood
as mental illness." 50 The court ultimately held that autism was not a
mental illness within the meaning of the mental illness limitation at issue
because the syndrome had an identifiable organic basis."1
The Kunin court also discussed the nature of the treatment, stating
that because autism is not treatable with traditional psychotherapy, it is
even less like a mental illness in the lay sense.5 2 This is strikingly simi-
lar to the analysis of the treatment approach courts. The Kunin court,
however, used the nature of the treatment merely as a factor in its causa-
tion analysis.
Another case of organic brain syndrome resulting in coverage for
the insured is Phillips v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. 3 There,
the insured's son suffered from a congenital organic brain disorder that
resulted in "abnormal behavioral symptoms" and required extensive psy-
chiatric treatment.54 Lincoln National refused to reimburse Phillips for
his son's treatment beyond the mental illness limit of a lifetime aggre-
gate of $25,000 for "charges for mental illness(es)." 55 The insurance
policy, however, did not define mental illness. Therefore, the court had
to determine whether organic brain syndrome, by definition a condition
with an organic basis, was a mental illness under the policy.
The Phillips court specifically relied on Kunin and agreed that
47. Id. at 1343.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1347. In that respect, consider brain cancer or a tumor located in the brain. Those
two conditions are likely to have behavior effects, but are not "mental illness" in any real sense.
51. Id. at 1347.
52. Id.
53. 774 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. I11. 1991).
54. Id. at 497.
55. Id. at 496.
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mental illness is a "behavioral disturbance with no demonstrable organic
or physical causes ....56 In contrast, medical evidence indicates that
organic brain syndrome has a physical origin, although that cause has
not been pinpointed to an exact location in the brain. Whereas Lincoln
National wanted to focus on the abnormal behavioral patterns of the
patient, the court stated that "aberrant behavioral symptoms... without
more, can not determine that a particular illness is a mental illness. '57
The court indicated in dicta that the insurer could have avoided
litigation by defining mental illness or by incorporating the classifica-
tions found in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I). 58 This dicta supports
this author's suggestion that insurers define mental illness more pre-
cisely and incorporate the diagnostic manuals created by the psychiatric
profession.
An earlier example of the causation approach occurred in Prince v.
United States Life Insurance Co.." There, the insured was treated for
psychological trauma resulting from the accidental loss of an eye. The
insurance company denied coverage for the trauma based on an exclu-
sion for "mental disease ... psychotic or psychoneurotic disorders or
reactions."60 The court held for the insured, finding that the average
person would believe that this exclusion applied only where the underly-
ing cause of the psychotic reaction was unrelated to a bodily injury.61
The Prince decision exemplifies the reasoning behind the causation
approach. Where the policy contains an ambiguous limitation or exclu-
sion, courts will interpret it against the insurer according to the rule of
contra proferentem. When the ambiguous term is mental illness, which
is often undefined in older policies, 62 causation courts will look to fac-
tors that the insurer may have intended to leave out, such as the cause or
etiology of the illness or disorder. Where that etiology is organic or
physical, causation courts will find that the term mental illness meant
56. Id. at 500 (emphasis added), citing Kunin, 696 F. Supp. at 1346.
57. Id. at 501.
58. Id. at 502. For a discussion of the DSM-IH see, infra, note 67.
59. 257 N.Y.S.2d 891 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965).
60. Id. at 892.
61. Id.
62. It should be noted that merely by including a definition of mental illness, insurers would
avoid most of this litigation. Recently, insurers have begun to include very broad definitions of
the term in their policies. Often the definition will follow Phillips and refer to diagnostic manuals
that classify mental disorders by symptom. When an insurer takes these few simple steps in
drafting, none of which are burdensome and which are in insurer's own interest, the policy
language is likely to preempt the causation approach. In the case of a specific definition of mental
illness, where a determination must be made, the symptom approach will be more appropriate. It
could be argued that an insurer who neglected this obvious step in drafting, especially after so
many cases, did not intend to exclude coverage.
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only those illnesses that could be classified as completely mental, both
in cause and effect.
Using that rationale, most causation approach cases result in judg-
ments for the insured. There are, however, exceptions. Consider Kille-
brew v. Abbott Laboratories,6" where the insured became disabled due
to emotional problems and headaches after he suffered from viral
encephalitis.64 Because the insured's doctors could find no organic basis
for his problems (although they did not rule out some link to the viral
encephalitis), the court held that the disability was "due to a functional
nervous disorder, '65 for which policy benefits were limited to twenty-
four months.66 The court cited the testimony of several doctors. The
doctors attributed the insured's condition to a functional problem for
which they could not locate a precise physical cause, although they
agreed that the viral encephalitis could have been the primary cause.67
Killebrew illustrates the limits of the causation approach: where no
cause can be shown, the unproven cause cannot be assumed to be physi-
cal, and the nature of the symptoms will support an inference that the
illness and the symptoms are the same. In Killebrew, the symptoms
were mental. Therefore, the court presumed that the illness was mental
as well.
Most of the cases exemplifying the causation approach 68 focus on a
layperson's understanding of what a mental illness is or should be, but
also take into account an expert's analysis of what caused the illness.
Where there is any physiological explanation for a "mental" result (such
as organic brain disease causing a behavioral or coping problem), causa-
tion courts will generally hold that the mental illness is not really mental
63. 352 So. 2d 332 (La. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd 359 So. 2d 1275 (La. 1978).
64. 352 So. 2d at 334.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 333.
67. Id. at 334.
68. Another important case using the causation approach is Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue
Shield, Inc. v. Doe, 733 S.W.2d 429 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987), where the court held that the insured
should be covered beyond the mental illness limits of the policy when bipolar affective disorder
was at issue. The disorder was shown to be an organically-based illness of the brain. Id. Thus,
the court held that the disorder was a physical illness. Id. at 431-33. For another example, see
Malerbi v. Central Reserve Life of N. Am. Ins. Co., 407 N.W.2d 157 (Neb. 1987), where the court
affirmed coverage for the insured based on a finding that the physical causation of a child's
behavioral problems was due to atypical organic brain syndrome. See also Gareis v. Benefit
Ass'n of Ry. Employees Ins. Co., 169 N.W.2d 730 (Minn. 1969) in which the court found
coverage for an insured suffering from mental problems and damage to the central nervous system
due to the deterioration of cells in the brain. Finally, the court in Akins v. Washington Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1990), found that an insured who suffered from
various mental ailments after a stabbing incident was covered under a disability policy where the
policy included coverage for all disability as a "result of" physical injury. Id. at 906. The court
held that the psychological problems were the result of the physical trauma.
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at all, and should not be subject to the mental illness limitation of the
insurance policy.
As courts hold this way, however, insurers are adjusting their pol-
icy language to foreclose this avenue of attack. 69 Instead of simply lim-
iting benefits for mental illness, insurers have begun expanding their
definition of mental illness in policies. They define mental illness as
"sickness which manifests symptoms which are primarily mental or ner-
vous, regardless of any underlying physical cause."7 °
III. THE PURPOSE OF THE DISTINCTION
The exact purposes of the mental-physical distinction are varied
and unclear. For courts, the distinction is a way to interpret ambiguous
or incomplete policy language. For insureds, the distinction is a way of
attacking coverage denials that saddle them with tremendous mental
health care bills. For insurers, however, the purpose of the distinction is
as ambiguous as the mental illness limitation itself.
Insurers generally make coverage distinctions and exclusions for
purposes of risk classification. 71 They seek out information on insur-
ance applications to determine who is at high risk for developing certain
illnesses that may be very costly to cover. By declining to cover those
69. Paul Appelbaum recognized this trend in Paul S. Appelbaum, Litigating Insurance
Coverage for Mental Disorders, 40 Hosp. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 993 (1989), and pointed
specifically to the changes implemented by the insurers involved in the Arkansas Blue Cross and
Blue Shield case. Id. at 994. In the new policies, psychiatric conditions were changed to "include
(whether organic or non-organic, whether of biological, non-biological, chemical or non-chemical
origin, and irrespective of cause, basis or inducement) mental disorders, mental illnesses,
psychiatric illnesses, mental conditions, and psychiatric conditions." Id. "The definition then lists
several classes of psychiatric disorders and notes that it intends to include all axis I and II
disorders listed in the current edition of DSM-III." Id.
Changes such as the one Appelbaum noted are certainly not isolated. Insurers are hastening
to respond to judicial commentary suggesting that if insurers would specify by which method
(symptom, cause or treatment) they intended to classify mental illnesses, the courts would follow
that specification. See Patterson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 948, 950 (9th Cir. 1993).
70. This is the exact language of the author's health insurance policy, issued by the Guardian
Life Insurance Company. The policy limits mental health care benefits to a $50,000 lifetime
aggregate while there is absolutely no limit for "most sicknesses or injuries." Guardian Life
Insurance Policy (on file with the author). The policy further states that "[w]e include a sickness
under this provision [limiting mental health benefits] if it manifests symptoms which are primarily
mental or nervous, regardless of any underlying physical cause." Id.
71. The traditional explanation of risk classification is that it is an exercise in "fair
discrimination." Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to be Left to the
Actuaries, 19 J.L. REaosm 349, 361 (1986). In other words, the insurer seeks to quantify the
burden that a particular policyholder places on the insurance pool, and then charge the
policyholder in accordance with that burden. Id. The most significant obstacle to "fair
discrimination" is the fact that Congress and most states have adopted antidiscrimination
measures. Id. at 361-70. The result is a series of arbitrary limitations and exclusions to avoid all
risk in particular categories. Id.
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illnesses, or covering them only up to a very low amount, insurers can
hold down costs and presumably maintain premium levels for other
insureds. The mental illness limitation, however, does not serve to
classify risk, because it is not feasible to predict mental illness with
enough accuracy to classify the risk of contracting those mental ill-
nesses. Therefore, insurers create across-the-board limitations to avoid
the expenses incurred by those few who are at high risk for mental
illness.72
Another problem with the mental illness limitation is that since it
was designed to limit coverage for illnesses traditionally considered
mental, it has become dated. Modem medical research is breaking down
the traditional distinction between mental and physical diseases and
causing people to rethink their position on when an illness or disorder
should be recognized as mental. Considering the evidence that many
mental illnesses are caused by measurable physiological affects in the
brain,73 the distinction drawn between mental and physical for insurance
coverage seems to distinguish nothing. The only distinction at this point
seems to be between one group of insureds whose illnesses manifest
themselves in socially stigmatized ways and another group of insureds
whose illnesses are more acceptable as physical injury or disease.
Another argument for the distinction is that mental treatment is not
considered to be as efficacious as, say, a cast on a broken leg. Whereas
the cast will have definite, predictable results, psychiatric treatment
could go on for years with only slight improvement.74 That, of course,
is the extreme example. Many of the classic mental illnesses such as
schizophrenia and bipolar affective mood disorder are considered to be
highly treatable conditions that respond well to therapy in tandem with
medications such as lithium. 75 The mental illness limitation is problem-
72. Insurers give various reasons for their fear of the moral hazard of offering mental health
insurance. Specifically, they point out that "demand for mental health services has been shown to
be highly responsive to the presence or absence of insurance coverage" and that "some forms of
treatment... [are] similar to nonprofessional forms of human support and interaction." Sabin &
Daniels, supra note 6, at 10. Insurers are also "acutely aware that clinicians can always find ways
to circumvent insurance restrictions." Id. at 12.
73. Brian Shannon discusses several medical research projects to illustrate this point:
"[M]edical researchers have made numerous findings establishing that serious mental illnesses
such as schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder, and depressive illness are biologically-based
diseases of the brain." Shannon, supra note 15, at 361 (footnotes omitted).
74. See Blostin, supra note 2, at 23. Consider the long-term nature of psychoanalysis:
patients often have regular appointments for months so that a psychiatrist, psychologist, or other
mental health care provider can slowly explore the patients' problems and then address them in a
non-traumatic fashion.
75. See generally Shannon, supra note 15, at 367-70. Shannon comments that "[a]lthough
serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder, and depressive illness
are not curable, they are treatable diseases." Id. at 369. However, insurers are correct that even
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atic because it implicitly assumes things about health care that are not
necessarily true, namely that the mentally ill can control their sickness
and that treating them will be ineffective over the long run.
Aware that many courts have adopted the causation approach,
insurers are quickly adjusting their policy language. As one commenta-
tor noted, "[t]he cases themselves demonstrate the inherent limitations of
a judicially oriented strategy for seeking equivalent coverage for psychi-
atric and medical illnesses. '76 Where a court expresses in dicta, as in
Rosenthal v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.," that it will give effect to
whatever choice of approaches the policy itself makes, insurers are more
than happy to adjust policy language to redefine mental illness to
exclude as much mental health care coverage as possible, usually incor-
porating the symptom courts' definition of mental illness.
Perhaps it is time to recognize that the mental illness limitation is
ineffective in fulfilling individual needs, and actually perpetuates socie-
tal discomfiture with mental illness. The stigmatization of mental illness
over the years seems to have slowly become limited to severe mental
illness, while it has become more acceptable to use professional services
and counseling to cope with stress and to ease life transitions. This new
attitude towards routine psychiatric services frightens insurers who offer
mental health coverage. They fear that insureds will begin to act more
like consumers of such services if their "consumption" will be reim-
bursed by a third party. Insurance companies would like to avoid this
result. To that end, insurance policies cover very small percentages of
out-patient mental services. This, in turn, acts as a disincentive to long-
term, regular psychiatric visits or therapy.78
treatment for these severe but treatable mental illnesses is long-term. For many manic depressive
people, the medication can never be discontinued without significant regression.
76. Appelbaum, supra note 69, at 993. Appelbaum notes changing policy language that
forecloses the results previously obtained in litigation, and he agrees that the "current distinction
between physical and mental disorders is a false one." Id. at 994.
77. 732 F. Supp. 108, 109 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
78. Recognition of routine counseling is also recognition of a possible sub-distinction: that
between the severely mentally ill and the temporarily or mildly mentally ill (which would include
those who could be colloquially called "stress cases"). It is remotely possible that this second
distinction could be drawn in such a way as to expand coverage for severe mental illness by
imposing high deductibles on mental health care. With a high enough deductible, only those truly
in need would reach it. After that, they would be fully covered for the remainder of their
treatment. Those in short-term care or other types of care, such as substance abuse treatment,
could be effectively eliminated from the expansion of coverage. The challenge is to not exclude
those severely mentally ill people who cannot afford treatment. The deductible must still be low
enough not to impoverish those in need.
In some circles, this would seem to be a workable and desirable approach, considering that
short-term and substance abuse care account for the largest increases in mental health care
expenditures: "[R]elatively few people incur a high proportion of mental health costs." Rubin,
supra note 9, at 164. And although those with severe mental illnesses experience longer periods
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A. Eliminating the Distinction
As discussed above, the mental-physical distinction masquerades as
a risk classification. The mental illness limitation does not separate high
risk from low risk groups. All it does is make it economically unreason-
able for people to obtain insurance to cover particular treatment, the
need for which is unpredictable without intensive investigation not nor-
mally required for health insurance. 79 The result is that the mental-phys-
ical distinction becomes a way for society's prejudices and insurers'
fears of increasing costs to burden a relatively small, but needy, group of
people. Currently, courts are being forced to make this distinction when
an insured has the resources to challenge an insurer's coverage determi-
nation. Either the courts should be relieved of this burden altogether, or
the distinction should be simplified so that it becomes more objective
and predictable.
To that end, this Comment suggests two solutions, both of which
would remove some level of the mental-physical distinction from the
purview of the courts. Neither solution can entirely eliminate the courts'
role in the process, because creative lawyering will always find a way to
mount challenges. But the propositions, if implemented, make it likely
that such conflicts will be reduced and simplified.
B. Systemizing the Approaches
First, the ambiguity of the distinction could be eliminated if the
courts moved towards one approach that would lead to predictable
results. The symptom approach would be the most enforceable and uni-
form, because it offers the benefit of focusing on the more easily
observed manifestations of disease and not the more difficult underlying
causes of illness. The symptom approach also reduces the need for
expert testimony, because symptom courts rely on layperson interpreta-
of hospitalization than those patients with other illnesses, these costs are confined to a relatively
small, needy group. Id.; see also Shannon, supra note 15, at 373 n.29, for the proposition that
substance abuse treatment and adolescent psychiatric care are "[t]he two main areas of escalating
costs." (citing ANNE M. O'KEEFE, NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL, ADVOCATING
FOR INSURANCE REFORM: A NAMI HANDBOOK 14-15 (1991)).
This sub-distinction, however, would lead to its own problems by countering some very
beneficial recent trends to expand coverage for substance abuse treatment as well as preventative
mental health care. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether insurers would be any more successful at
distinguishing these two roughly defined groups of mental health care consumers.
79. "Persons with chronic disabling illness, and especially persons with serious and persistent
mental illness, are likely to have high and often unpredictable health expenditures." Mechanic,
supra note 4, at 359 (emphasis added). Mechanic's article suggests several interesting insurance
reforms in the area of mental health care. Where high costs for disabling illness are involved, he
proposes a cap on what primary insurance should pay, beyond which a reinsurance plan should
provide coverage. Id. at 359-60.
[Vol. 50:345
MESSING WITH OUR MINDS
tions of mental illness. While causation courts would be required to
alter their analyses, symptom courts could still base their determinations
on the symptoms the patient displays. This is more preferable than
searching for evidence that a particular symptom is brought about by, for
example, a chemical imbalance or cellular breakdown in the brain. Fur-
thermore, the symptom approach has the advantage of being compatible
with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders that the
medical profession uses to classify mental illnesses.8 0 Because the
DSM-III already classifies by symptom, it can be incorporated into
existing policies and case law to ease the decision-making process.
By focusing merely on the manifestation of illness, courts, insurers,
and insureds would have a baseline that could not be easily disputed by
conflicting medical expert diagnoses and opinions. The symptom
approach could possibly eliminate the battle of the experts and the
necessity of testing for a wide range of possible physical causes of a
mental illness. Furthermore, the language of most insurance policies
expresses or suggests the intent of insurers to avoid coverage for mental
illnesses as commonly defined. The symptom approach defers to this
intention and seems to be more true to the language of the insurance
policy.
The symptom approach, however, has the distinct disadvantage of
eliminating coverage for many mentally ill patients whose problems
stem from an organic or physiological cause, and who could be treated
with medicine as well as psychotherapy. At the same time, the symptom
approach avoids the real issue of exactly what the insurance policy
means by mental illness. In simpler terms, the symptom approach is
unfair and callous.
An insured person expects to be covered, with reasonable limita-
tions and restrictions, for all illness as that term is commonly under-
stood. The average insured believes that she will be covered when
something goes wrong with her body and there is readily available treat-
ment for the problem. In the case of mental illness, there are various
modes of treatment, none of which the average insured can utilize above
a minimal level because of the debate over whether a mental illness
80. Many courts refer to the DSM-III-R when making the distinction between mental and
physical illness. As the Rosenthal court noted, the manual is a diagnostic tool for the profession
that classifies mental disorders according to symptoms in order for appropriate treatments to be
chosen. Rosenthal, 732 F. Supp. at 110.
The DSM-III-R, published by the American Psychiatric Association, is described as the
"official diagnostic manual of psychiatry." Ramage, supra note 3, at 953 n.10. The manual
"classifies mental illness by certain diagnostic criteria along five 'axes,' each referring to a
different class of information. Axes I through III comprise official diagnostic assessments ...
Axis I includes the severe mental illnesses: (for example,] schizophrenia... and affective (mood)
disorders." Id. (citation omitted).
1996]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
qualifies as something going wrong with the body. Many people know
today that mental illnesses can be physically or organically caused, such
as by a chemical imbalance in the brain, hormonal imbalance, or slight
brain damage. For example, Alzheimer's disease is a devastating physi-
cal illness that reduces the workings of a bright mind to a series of mis-
firing synapses. People are aware that some physiological problems will
have mental results. They expect that these problems, including the
mental results, will be covered.
The final weakness of this first solution is the fact that it would be
unreasonable to expect courts in multiple jurisdictions to settle on one
approach to a problem and consistently apply that approach in the face
of changing fact patterns and sympathetic plaintiffs. Each court has dif-
fering opinions that will not be erased solely by a recognized need for
uniformity. That goal, worthy though it may be, will not justify what
some would see as manifest unfairness and incursion into the judicial
sphere.
C. Fine Tuning the Mental Illness Limitation
There is another option. Designed to eliminate the need for the
mental-physical distinction drawn by the courts, the second solution
would require or strongly encourage the insurance companies to make
their policy language so clear and precise that courts would rarely be
involved. This solution, requiring a combination of precise policy lan-
guage, limited exclusions, and state mandates, is more predictable and
objective, virtually eliminates the distinction, and expands coverage for
the mentally ill to what many would consider an equitable level.
Courts are in the habit of giving effect to the language of contracts,
including insurance policies wherever possible. 81 It is only where lan-
guage is ambiguous or missing that courts must step in. 2 Under the
second solution, because insurance companies would be required to
make their policy language more precise and public, the courts would no
longer have to distinguish between mental and physical illness, regard-
less of who benefits from the clarity. Insurance companies have already
taken the lead in this respect, tailoring the language of their newer poli-
81. See Levy, supra note 14, at 625; see also Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Berry, 260
Cal. Rptr. 819, 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Rakoffv. World Ins. Co., 191 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1966).
82. Ambiguities in insurance policies are to be construed as much as possible in favor of the
insured and against the insurer. This "contra insurer" rule of contract interpretation permeates
state court approaches around the country. See, e.g. Simons v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 536
N.Y.S.2d 431, 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Brewer v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150,
153 (8th Cir. 1990); Patterson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 948, 950 (9th Cir. 1993).
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cies to the holdings of the symptom courts.83
In order to achieve this precision, insurance companies that have
not already done so could create policies containing a non-exhaustive
list of mental illnesses that they will cover or exclude. Such a list could
incorporate existing lists found in the DSM-III-R. Once companies
make such a list, other illnesses could be categorized according to simi-
lar illnesses on the list. By creating very specific definitions and limita-
tions, insurers could avoid the challenges that have plagued them in the
past.
Were the task to be left entirely to the insurance companies, how-
ever, coverage for mental illnesses would certainly remain fixed at cur-
rent levels or even be reduced. To guarantee a minimum amount of
coverage to the mentally ill under these more precise policies will
require legislative initiative. State law governs most insurance regimes
and allows insurance companies flexibility in their exclusions and limi-
tations in order to hold down costs. 84 While it remains to be seen
whether the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 5 which includes
severe mental illness as a qualified disability, will mandate some cover-
age not otherwise possible, even the ADA will not be able to affect all
areas. State mandates will be needed to fill the gaps left both by the
insurance companies and the ADA.
Many states have already attempted mandates on limited scales,
with varying degrees of success.8 6 Most mandates are qualified with
various exemptions and waivers. Texas and Maryland, in particular,
have taken significant, symbolic steps towards equalizing coverage for
mental and physical illnesses. The Texas Insurance Code87 provides that
insurers operating in the state must "offer and make available"8 8 cover-
age for "serious mental illness"'8 9 at the same level as coverage for other
83. Consider the change in the policy language of the policy challenged in Arkansas Blue
Cross and Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe, 733 S.W.2d 429 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987), which at the time of the
suit merely limited care for "mental" illness. After the court found for the insured, the insurer
expansively amended the policy language. For a verbatim reading of the language, see
Appelbaum, supra note 69, at 944. The amended policy refers to the DSM-III-R to expand its
already-broad definition. Id.
84. Appelbaum, supra note 69, at 994.
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 Supp.).
86. The newest mandate for mental health coverage in Texas requires equalized coverage for
"severe mental illnesses" (a limited category that includes schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and a
few other organically-based brain disorders). For a discussion, see Shannon, supra note 15, at
390-95.
87. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ArN. art. 3.51-14 (West Supp. 1995).
88. Id.
89. Defined to include "(1) schizophrenia; (2) paranoid and other psychotic disorders; (3)
bipolar disorders (mixed, manic, and depressive); (4) major depressive disorders (single episode
or recurrent); and (5) schizo-affective disorders (bipolar or depressive)." Id. § 1.
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types of illnesses. The most serious flaw in this provision is that the
equalized coverage need only be offered and made available, suggesting
that insureds9" may decline to accept it in order to lower their premium
costs. Maryland's Insurance Code,9' which mandates coverage for
mental illness to the same extent as any other illness covered by an
insurance policy, seems to suffer from a similar defect: it provides that
insurers operating in the state "may not discriminate against any person
with a mental illness"' 92 through different coverage terms and conditions,
but it then limits the benefits that must be paid based on the number of
outpatient visits per calendar year.93
A state law mandating equalized coverage for mental and physical
illness would be optimal. But for many reasons, this type of mandate is
very unlikely to find political support. A more realistic approach would
be to start on a smaller scale, one more palatable to political constituen-
cies. State mandates that create packages of mental health benefits
would have different requirements and might not entail equalized cover-
age of mental care, but would be a start towards expanded coverage of
mental health care.94 The goal is either to decrease the mental illness
limitations or to reduce those diseases that qualify as mental illnesses
under the limitations. Some courts have already attempted the latter idea
through use of the mental-physical distinction. This distinction, how-
ever, has failed to improve the lot of the insured mentally ill, because
insurance companies can adjust their policy language to circumvent the
reasoning of the causation courts and incorporate the reasoning of the
symptom courts.
State mandates, then, should decrease the mental illness limitations
in some way without also increasing current limitations on physical ill-
ness. While it is possible that the ADA will offer some guidance, it
should be the states that take the initiative in equalizing mental health
care coverage, because state law governs most insurance plans.95
90. The term "insured" here also includes employers and other group representatives who
speak for the individual insureds of their groups. Id. § 2.
91. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 490V (1992 Supp.).
92. Id. at (b).
93. Id. Because health insurance is often a benefit of employment and chosen or negotiated
by the employer, this limit will often occur on a group basis. This is a rational response by
employers, because omitting certain categories of coverage reduces the premiums that both the
employees and the employer will have to pay.
94. In this respect, the Texas Insurance Code provision seems to be a very acceptable start. It
should, however, be made mandatory. As phrased now, it is similar to many other state insurance
provisions that require insurers to offer an endorsement for mental health care. The problem with
these endorsements is that they are prohibitively expensive and, therefore, likely to be waived or
declined.
95. State mandates would also tend to extend assistance to the ever-increasing group of
uninsureds, either through mandates to nonprofit providers or state-sponsored health care
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III, CONCLUSION
The best solution to the problem of the mental illness limitation is
to eliminate the need for the mental-physical distinction with more pre-
cise language and better coverage, even if that requires state mandates in
the form of legislated mental health care packages. Insurers should be
able to contain costs without discriminating against the mentally ill. By
wording the mental illness limitations more precisely, insurers will elim-
inate the confusion caused by judicially created distinctions. Insurers
could incorporate statistical manuals or list the covered disorders to cre-
ate this precision. Insurance companies have a recognized right to bar-
gain their way out of certain obligations. But they can not conscionably
eliminate or reduce to embarrassing levels coverage for all mentally ill
people simply because they fear that some unpredictable group with
only minor psychological problems will increase costs for short-term
mental care. Insurers should find a different way to contain these costs.
YOUNDY C. COOK
programs. However, this Comment is limited in scope to the problems of those insureds who are
underinsured with respect to mental health care.
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